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OPINION OF THE COURT 
                     
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 
 This appeal raises several questions of first 
impression in this court concerning the ability of intervenors to 
challenge orders of confidentiality pertaining to settlement 
agreements.  These questions are extremely important in light of 
the widespread and increasing use by district courts of 
3 
confidentiality orders to facilitate settlements, and the 
consequential sacrifice of public access to the information 
deemed confidential by such orders. 
 Ottaway Newspapers, Inc. ("Ottaway"), The Pocono Record 
("the Record"), Ronald F. Bouchard and the Pennsylvania Newspaper 
Publishers Association (collectively, "the Newspapers") filed 
this action in the district court seeking to intervene in an 
action that had been settled between John A. Pansy and the 
Borough of Stroudsburg ("the Borough").  The Newspapers' purpose 
for intervening was to gain access to the Settlement Agreement 
which was entered into between Pansy and the Borough.  The 
Newspapers argued that either the Agreement was a judicial record 
to which it had a right of access, or that the Order of 
Confidentiality which the court entered concerning the Agreement 
should be modified or vacated.  The district court ruled that the 
Newspapers' motion for intervention was untimely.  In the 
alternative, the district court held that the Agreement was not a 
judicial record, and therefore not accessible under the right of 
access doctrine.  The district court denied the Newspapers' 
Motion to Intervene and Motion to Reconsider, Vacate or Modify 
the Order of Confidentiality.  This appeal followed. 
 For the reasons stated below, we will reverse the order 
of the district court and direct that the Newspapers be permitted 
to intervene.  We will remand the case to the district court for 




JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The district court entered a final order denying the 
Motion to Intervene and the Motion to Amend, Vacate or Modify by 
the Newspapers.  Accordingly, we have jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.  See Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust and Sav. Ass'n v. 
Hotel Rittenhouse Assocs., 800 F.2d 339, 341 n.2 (3d Cir. 1986). 
 The standard of review for each issue raised in this 
appeal will be discussed in the analysis of the issue.  Where 
this appeal raises a legal question, we exercise plenary review. 
Prisco v. Talty, 993 F.2d 21, 24 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 
DISCUSSION 
A.  BACKGROUND 
 In May, 1991, Pansy filed an action in the district 
court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the Borough 
violated his civil rights.  Prior to Pansy's filing that action, 
he had been Chief of the Borough's Police Department.  While 
Chief, he was investigated and later arrested by agents of the 
Pennsylvania Attorney General's Office.  Pansy was charged with 
offenses relating to the alleged improper handling of parking 
meter money.  The Borough subsequently suspended him from the 
force and demoted him to patrolman.  The demotion and suspension, 
in turn, led to Pansy's filing a civil rights action. Ultimately, 
Pansy was tried and acquitted of all criminal charges. 
 Pansy and the Borough agreed to settle the civil rights 
action and the Settlement Agreement was presented to and reviewed 
by the district court.  The Newspapers were not involved with the 
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settlement.  On June 5, 1992, the district court entered an order 
indicating that it had reviewed the terms of settlement and 
directing that the case be considered dismissed with prejudice 
upon the expiration of sixty days or consummation of settlement. 
The order also stated that "the terms of settlement are 
confidential and the parties hereby are ordered and directed to 
abide by the order of confidentiality."  App. at 54-55.  The 
Settlement Agreement was never filed with the district court. 
 On October 22, 1992, the Record sent the Borough a 
request for information pursuant to the Pennsylvania Right to 
Know Act ("the Act"), Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 65, §§ 66.1-.4. (1959 & 
Supp. 1993).  The request sought information and documents 
pertaining to the civil rights case, including the Settlement 
Agreement. 
 On November 25, 1992, the Borough sent a response to 
the Record which included some information concerning the 
monetary cost to the Borough in settling the case.  However, the 
Borough refused to provide access to the Settlement Agreement 
itself, and related documents, ostensibly because the district 
court's June 5, 1992 Order of Confidentiality prohibited its 
divulgence.  The Borough has continued to refuse to provide the 
Settlement Agreement to the Newspapers. 
 On December 23, 1992, the Newspapers filed a petition 
in the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County, Pennsylvania, 
challenging the Borough's refusal to produce documents pursuant 
to §§ 66.3 and 66.4 of the Right to Know Act.  By order of that 
6 
court, the state court litigation has been stayed pending the 
resolution of this case. 
 On December 23, 1992, the Newspapers also filed the 
motions in the district court which are the subject of this 
appeal.  They filed a Motion to Intervene in the settled civil 
rights action between Pansy and the Borough, as well as a Motion 
to Reconsider, Vacate, or Modify the district court's June 5, 
1992 Order.  Specifically, the Newspapers sought the Settlement 
Agreement as a judicial record.  In the alternative, they sought 
to modify or vacate the June 5, 1992 Order of Confidentiality so 
they could obtain the Settlement Agreement pursuant to the 
Pennsylvania Right to Know Act. 
 The district court concluded that the Motion to 
Intervene was untimely.  Alternatively, the district court 
addressed the merits of the right of access claim.  It found that 
even if intervention was proper, the Settlement Agreement was not 
a judicial record because it was never filed with the court and, 
therefore, the Newspapers had no right to obtain the Settlement 
Agreement under the right of access doctrine.  The district court 




1.  Standing 
 The appellees have not challenged the Newspapers' 
standing in this appeal.  Nevertheless, we are obliged to 
consider whether the Newspapers have standing to intervene in 
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this action to either obtain the sought-after Settlement 
Agreement under the right of access doctrine, or to attack the 
Order of Confidentiality so that they may seek access to the 
document under the Pennsylvania Right to Know Act.  The 
requirements for an Article III case or controversy were stated 
in Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for 
Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 102 S. Ct. 
752 (1982): 
Art. III requires the party who invokes the court's 
authority to show that he personally has suffered some 
actual or threatened injury as a result of the 
putatively illegal conduct of the defendant, and that 
the injury fairly can be traced to the challenged 
action and is likely to be redressed by a favorable 
decision. 
 
Id. at 472, 102 S. Ct. at 758 (internal quotations and citations 
omitted). 
 We have routinely found, as have other courts, that 
third parties have standing to challenge protective orders and 
confidentiality orders0 in an effort to obtain access to 
information or judicial proceedings.  E.g., Brown v. Advantage 
Eng'g, Inc., 960 F.2d 1013, 1016 (11th Cir. 1992); Public Citizen 
v. Liggett Group Inc., 858 F.2d 775, 787 & n.12 (1st Cir. 1988), 
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1030, 109 S. Ct. 838 (1989); In re 
Alexander Grant & Co. Litig., 820 F.2d 352, 354 (11th Cir. 1987); 
                                                           
0In this opinion, the term "confidentiality order" will be used 
to denote any court order which in any way restricts access to or 
disclosure of any form of information or proceeding, including 
but not limited to "protective orders", "sealing orders" and 
"secrecy orders".  "Protective orders" properly denote court 
orders over information exchanged during discovery. See Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 26(c). 
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United States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835, 845 (3d Cir. 1978); 
City of Hartford v. Chase, 733 F. Supp. 533, 534 (D. Conn. 1990), 
rev'd on other grounds, 942 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1991).  The 
Newspapers may have standing notwithstanding the fact that "they 
assert rights that may belong to a broad portion of the public at 
large.  So long as the 'injury in fact' alleged by each 
intervenor is 'a distinct and palpable injury to himself,' 
standing should not be denied 'even if it is an injury shared by 
a large class of other possible litigants.'"  Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 
at 845 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501, 95 S. Ct. 
2197, 2206 (1975)). 
 Moreover, to establish standing, it is not necessary 
for litigants to demonstrate that they will prevail on the merits 
of their claim.  See Warth, 422 U.S. at 500, 95 S. Ct. at 2206. 
Therefore, in determining whether the Newspapers have standing, 
we need not determine that the Newspapers will ultimately obtain 
access to the sought-after Settlement Agreement.  We need only 
find that the Order of Confidentiality being challenged presents 
an obstacle to the Newspapers' attempt to obtain access.  The 
Newspapers have met the standing requirements in this case: they 
have shown that the putatively invalid Confidentiality Order 
which the district court entered interferes with their attempt to 
obtain access to the Settlement Agreement, either under the right 
of access doctrine or pursuant to the Pennsylvania Right to Know 
Act. 
 
2.  Intervention 
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 The district court denied the Newspapers' Motion for 
Intervention.  We normally review the district court's denial of 
the Newspapers' Motion for Intervention for abuse of discretion. 
Harris v. Pernsley, 820 F.2d 592, 597 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 
484 U.S. 947, 108 S. Ct. 336 (1987).  However, because the 
question raised is whether the district court applied the correct 
legal standard for intervention, we exercise plenary review.  Cf. 
Savarese v. Agriss, 883 F.2d 1194, 1200 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 The district court denied the Newspapers' Motion for 
Intervention for two reasons.  First, it determined that the 
Motion for Intervention was untimely because the case had already 
been settled for at least six months.  Second, it found that the 
Newspapers did not demonstrate that their interest in the case 
had anything in common with a question of law or fact in the main 
action and therefore did not meet the requirements of Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 24(b)(2).0 
 The district court applied incorrect legal standards in 
denying the Newspapers' Motion for Intervention.  As to the 
district court's finding that the Newspapers have not shown that 
their claim has anything in common with a question of law or fact 
in the case, the district court ruled contrary to a forming 
consensus in the federal courts.  We agree with other courts that 
                                                           
0Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b) provides in part: 
 
 Permissive Intervention.  Upon timely application 
anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) 
when a statute of the United States confers a 
conditional right to intervene; or (2) when an 
applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a 
question of law or fact in common. 
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have held that the procedural device of permissive intervention 
is appropriately used to enable a litigant who was not an 
original party to an action to challenge protective or 
confidentiality orders entered in that action.  E.g., Beckman 
Indus., Inc. v. International Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 473-74 (9th 
Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S. Ct. 197 (1992); United 
Nuclear Corp. v. Cranford Ins. Co., 905 F.2d 1424, 1427 (10th 
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1073, 111 S. Ct. 799 (1991); 
Public Citizen v. Liggett Group, Inc., 858 F.2d 775, 783-87 (1st 
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1030, 109 S. Ct. 838 (1989); 
Meyer Goldberg, Inc., of Lorain v. Fisher Foods, Inc., 823 F.2d 
159, 161-64 (6th Cir. 1987); Martindell v. International Tel. & 
Tel. Corp., 594 F.2d 291, 294 (2d Cir. 1979); In re Beef Indus. 
Antitrust Litig., 589 F.2d 786, 788-89 (5th Cir. 1979); City of 
Hartford v. Chase, 733 F. Supp. 533, 534 (D. Conn. 1990), rev'd 
on other grounds, 942 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1991); In re Franklin 
Nat'l Bank Sec. Litig., 92 F.R.D. 468, 470-71 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), 
aff'd sub nom. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Ernst & Ernst, 677 
F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1982) [hereinafter FDIC].  In Beckman, the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated: 
[S]pecificity, e.g., that the [intervenors'] claim 
involve . . . the same legal theory [that was raised in 
the main action], is not required when intervenors are 
not becoming parties to the litigation.  There is no 
reason to require such a strong nexus of fact or law 
when a party seeks to intervene only for the purpose of 
modifying a protective order. 
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966 F.2d at 474.0  The reasoning in Beckman is persuasive, and we 
adopt it.  We therefore reject the district court's conclusion 
that the Newspapers have not shown their claim has anything in 
common with a question of law or fact in the case, and therefore 
cannot intervene.  By virtue of the fact that the Newspapers 
challenge the validity of the Order of Confidentiality entered in 
the main action, they meet the requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 
24(b)(2) that their claim must have "a question of law or fact in 
common" with the main action.0 
 The district court's second reason for denying the 
Newspapers' motion for intervention was that the motion to 
intervene was untimely, as it was made approximately six and one-
half months from the date of settlement.  In support of its 
holding, the district court cited dicta from a footnote in an 
opinion by this court, Littlejohn v. Bic Corp., 851 F.2d 673, 677 
n.7 (3d Cir. 1988), which stated that "'intervention is ancillary 
                                                           
0The Beckman court also noted that although permissive 
intervention ordinarily requires independent jurisdictional 
grounds, an independent jurisdictional basis is not required 
because intervenors do not seek to litigate a claim on the 
merits.  966 F.2d at 473.  Thus, in cases where intervenors seek 
to modify an order of the court, the court has jurisdiction based 
on the fact that it already has the power to modify the 
protective order and no independent jurisdictional basis is 
needed.  Id. 
0We therefore do not follow dicta in our decision in Littlejohn 
v. Bic Corp., 851 F.2d 673 (3d Cir. 1988), which stated: "Third 
parties seeking access to the judicial record after the 
termination of an action may therefore be required to proceed by 
complaint or order to show cause."  Id. at 677 n.7. That 
statement is dicta because, as the Littlejohn court pointed out, 
the intervention issue was not raised on appeal.  Id.  Of course, 
as an alternative to permissive intervention, parties may choose 
to proceed by complaint or order to show cause to challenge 
confidentiality orders. 
12 
and subordinate to a main cause and whenever an action is 
terminated, for whatever reason, there no longer remains an 
action in which there can be an intervention,'" id. (quoting 
Black v. Central Motors Lines, Inc., 500 F.2d 407, 408 (4th Cir. 
1974)). 
 We do not follow the dicta quoted above from Littlejohn 
because it announces an inappropriate rule and is contrary to the 
majority of courts that have decided the issue.  These courts 
have allowed intervention by parties for the limited purpose of 
modifying a confidentiality or protective order even after the 
underlying dispute between the parties has been settled.  See, 
e.g., Beckman, 966 F.2d at 471, 473-75; Brown v. Advantage Eng'g, 
Inc., 960 F.2d 1013, 1014-16 (11th Cir. 1992); United Nuclear, 
905 F.2d at 1426-29; Public Citizen, 858 F.2d at 783-87; Meyer 
Goldberg, 823 F.2d at 161-64; Stallworth v. Monsanto Co., 558 
F.2d 257, 260-70 (5th Cir. 1977); In re Franklin Nat'l Bank Sec. 
Litig., 92 F.R.D. at 469-71; see Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust and Sav. 
Ass'n v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assocs., 800 F.2d 339, 342 n.2 (3d 
Cir. 1986).0  Discussion in a recent decision by this court 
                                                           
0One case has been found which contradicts the general rule that 
intervenors will be granted permissive intervention to challenge 
confidentiality orders.  In United States v. Kentucky Utils. Co., 
927 F.2d 252 (6th Cir. 1991), the Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit expressed skepticism as to whether intervention to 
challenge a confidentiality order would be appropriate.  The 
court stated: 
 
Because the papers [sought] are not in the court 
record, but are instead copies of private documents 
that came into the possession of the DOJ only for the 
limited purposes of discovery and were not safeguarded 
by a protective order during discovery, [the potential 
intervenor] faces a formidable burden in attempting to 
13 
reflects the growing consensus among the courts of appeals that 
intervention to challenge confidentiality orders may take place 
long after a case has been terminated.  In Leucadia, Inc. v. 
Applied Extrusion Technologies, Inc., 998 F.2d 157 (3d Cir. 
1993), we stated that "a district court may properly consider a 
motion to intervene permissively for the limited purpose of 
modifying a protective order even after the underlying dispute 
between the parties has long been settled."  Id. at 161 n.5. This 
recognition in Leucadia, in combination with the forming 
consensus in other courts of appeals, provides strong reasons to 
allow a district court to grant permissive intervention in order 
to allow litigation of ancillary issues even after a case has 
been concluded. 
   In Public Citizen, the Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit reasoned that where an intervenor is litigating an 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
demonstrate that her desire for access to materials of 
such a private nature rises to the status of an 
interest of so significant a magnitude as to entitle 
her to participate as a party to the action and 
challenge the . . . order. 
 
Id. at 255.  It should be noted that the Kentucky Utilities court 
cited no authority for the above-quoted passage.  It contains no 
analysis, nor does it articulate any workable standards, 
concerning whether a party may intervene in an action to 
challenge a protective or confidentiality order.  It merely 
asserts the phrase "formidable burden".  Moreover, as a matter of 
policy the holding in Kentucky Utilities is unacceptable since it 
makes it almost impossible for the public to intervene in actions 
even involving important public matters to challenge protective 
or confidentiality orders.  We therefore cannot join the position 
taken by the Sixth Circuit in Kentucky Utilities. 
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ancillary issue, the potential for prejudice to the original 
parties due to the delay in intervention0 is minimized: 
[A] factor to be considered is the prejudice to 
existing parties due to [a litigant's] delay in 
intervening.  This factor encompasses the basic 
fairness notion that intervention should not work a 
"last minute disruption of painstaking work by the 
parties and the court."  For purposes of this factor, 
therefore, it is necessary to ask why a would-be 
intervenor seeks to participate, for if the desired 
intervention relates to an ancillary issue and will not 
disrupt the resolution of the underlying merits, 
untimely intervention is much less likely to prejudice 
the parties.  Here, of course, [the intervenor's] 
motion pertains to a particularly discrete and 
ancillary issue, as demonstrated by the fact that the 
merits of the case have been already concluded and are 
no longer subject to review.  Because [the intervenor] 
sought to litigate only the issue of the protective 
order, and not to reopen the merits, we find that its 
delayed intervention caused little prejudice to the 
existing parties in this case. 
 
858 F.2d at 786 (citations omitted). 
 This reasoning is persuasive and we adopt it.  We also 
note that in cases dealing with access to information, the public 
and third parties may often have no way of knowing at the time a 
confidentiality order is granted what relevance the settling case 
has to their interests.  Therefore, to preclude third parties 
from challenging a confidentiality order once a case has been 
settled would often make it impossible for third parties to have 
their day in court to contest the scope or need for 
confidentiality.  We therefore expressly hold today what we 
observed in our opinion in Leucadia: "a district court may 
                                                           
0Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b) provides, in part, that in exercising its 
discretion in determining whether to allow permissive 
intervention, "the court shall consider whether the intervention 
will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of 
the original parties." 
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properly consider a motion to intervene permissively for the 
limited purpose of modifying [or vacating] a [confidentiality] 
order even after the underlying dispute between the parties has 
long been settled."  998 F.2d at 161 n.5.0 
 The facts of this case lead us to conclude that 
intervention should not be deemed untimely.  In United Nuclear, 
intervention was permitted approximately three years after the 
underlying action was settled and dismissed, 905 F.2d at 1427, 
and in Beckman, intervention was allowed approximately two years 
after the underlying case was terminated, 966 F.2d at 471, 473. 
In the instant case, there was only a six and one-half month 
delay between the time of settlement and the motion for 
                                                           
0In Commonwealth of Pa. v. Rizzo, 530 F.2d 501 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 426 U.S. 921, 96 S. Ct. 2628 (1976), we listed three 
factors to consider in determining whether a motion to intervene 
is timely: (1) how far the proceedings have gone when the movant 
seeks to intervene; (2) prejudice which resultant delay might 
cause to other parties; and (3) the reason for the delay.  Id. at 
506.  In Delaware Valley Citizens' Council v. Commonwealth of 
Pa., 674 F.2d 970 (3d Cir. 1982), we also stated that "a motion 
to intervene after entry of a decree should be denied except in 
extraordinary circumstances," id. at 974. However, Rizzo and 
Delaware Valley involved parties seeking to intervene and 
litigate the merits of the underlying suit.  The standards 
articulated in Rizzo and Delaware Valley are therefore not 
helpful in cases such as the instant one, where the intervenors 
do not wish to litigate the merits of the underlying suit, but 
rather only seek to litigate an ancillary issue, such as a 
protective or confidentiality order.  For example, the first 
Rizzo factor will rarely be helpful in cases where the intervenor 
is challenging a confidentiality order over a settlement 
agreement, because the order usually takes effect upon the 
termination of an action.  Thus, to ask how far the proceedings 
have gone is pointless.  Therefore, although Rizzo, Delaware 
Valley and their progeny are good law, they do not control in 
cases such as the one which is the subject of this appeal, where 
the potential intervenors wish only to litigate a question 
ancillary to the underlying suit. 
16 
intervention.0  This relatively short delay, in itself, leads us 
to the conclusion that intervention should be permitted.0      
    
3.  The Right of Access Doctrine 
 Although the district court denied intervention by the 
Newspapers, it made an alternative holding.  Assuming that 
intervention was proper, the district court considered the merits 
of the Newspapers' challenge to the Order of Confidentiality and 
their attempt to obtain access to the Settlement Agreement.  The 
district court determined that the Settlement Agreement was not a 
"judicial record," and it therefore denied the Newspapers' motion 
to obtain access to the Settlement Agreement under the right of 
access doctrine. 
 We have previously recognized a right of access to 
judicial proceedings and judicial records, and this right of 
access is "beyond dispute."  Littlejohn v. Bic Corp., 851 F.2d 
673, 677-78 (3d Cir. 1988) (quoting Publicker Indus., Inc. v. 
Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1066 (3d Cir. 1984)).  "The balancing of 
factors for and against access is a decision committed to the 
                                                           
0We also note that the Record sent the Borough a request for 
information pursuant to the Pennsylvania Right to Know Act on 
October 22, 1992, just over four months from the date of 
settlement.  Only after the Borough refused to provide the Record 
with the Settlement Agreement did the Record realize that court 
action would be necessary.  These facts indicate that the Record 
was diligent in seeking the Settlement Agreement, and that its 
motion for intervention therefore cannot be deemed untimely. 
0We need not address whether in some circumstances a trial court, 
in the exercise of its discretion, may rightly conclude that 
untimeliness or other factors relating to the particular claimant 
justify refusal of intervention where the intervenors seek to 
contest an ancillary issue. 
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discretion of the district court, although it is not generally 
accorded the narrow review reserved for discretionary decisions 
based on first-hand observations."  Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust and 
Sav. Ass'n v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assocs., 800 F.2d 339, 344 (3d 
Cir. 1986) (citations omitted).  In this case, however, the 
district court reached its conclusion through a legal 
determination that the Settlement Agreement was not a "judicial 
record" accessible under the right of access doctrine.  We will 
therefore exercise plenary review over the district court's legal 
determination.  See 1st Westco Corp. v. School Dist. of Phila., 6 
F.3d 108, 112 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 The Newspapers argue that the Settlement Agreement 
which Pansy and the Borough entered into is a "judicial record," 
accessible under the right of access doctrine.  If the Settlement 
Agreement is a judicial record, then Rittenhouse would be binding 
and the Agreement should be released by the district court.  In 
Rittenhouse, this court held that a settlement agreement deemed a 
judicial record is accessible under the right of access doctrine. 
800 F.2d at 344-45.  We specifically held that the strong 
presumption of access outweighed the interest in promoting 
settlements, which in the matter before us is the only interest 
which the Borough has argued in favor of maintaining the Order of 
Confidentiality.  Id.  Therefore, if the Settlement Agreement is 
a judicial record, it should be released by the district court 
itself under the right of access doctrine, and there would be no 
need for the Newspapers to demonstrate that the Settlement 
18 
Agreement is a public record under the Pennsylvania Right to Know 
Act. 
 However, our prior decisions preclude a finding that 
the Settlement Agreement is a judicial record accessible under 
the right of access doctrine.  See Internal Operating Procedures 
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 9.1 
(July 1990) ("It is the tradition of this court that the holding 
of a panel in a reported opinion is binding on subsequent 
panels.").  In Enprotech Corp. v. Renda, 983 F.2d 17 (3d Cir. 
1993), we indicated that when a settlement agreement is not filed 
with the court, it is not a "judicial record" for purposes of the 
right of access doctrine.  Id. at 20-21.  In Enprotech, we held 
that since the "Settlement Agreement ha[d] not been filed with, 
placed under seal, interpreted or enforced by the district 
court", it was not a judicial record.  Id. at 20.  The Enprotech 
court went on to hold: "Moreover, the Agreement will not become a 
part of the public record unless and until the district court may 
order the parties to comply with its terms."  Id.  at 21.  The 
Enprotech Court so held even though the district court in that 
case specifically retained jurisdiction over the settlement 
agreement until its expiration so that it could enforce its 
terms.  Id. 
 In the instant case, the Settlement Agreement which is 
subject to the Order of Confidentiality was never filed with, 
interpreted or enforced by the district court.  The district 
court has not ordered any of the terms of the Settlement 
Agreement to be complied with.  Accordingly, Enprotech controls 
19 
the instant case and leads us to conclude that the Settlement 
Agreement is not a judicial record, and the right of access 
doctrine cannot be a basis for the Newspapers to obtain access to 
the Agreement.  In contrast, in Rittenhouse we found that the 
settlement agreement was a judicial record because it had been 
filed with and enforced by the district court.  800 F.2d at 344-
45. 
 Another decision by this court indicates that the 
Settlement Agreement is not a judicial record accessible under 
the right of access doctrine.  In Littlejohn v. Bic Corp., 851 
F.2d 673 (3d Cir. 1988), we addressed the question of whether 
documents which were admitted into evidence and had become 
judicial records were accessible under the right of access 
doctrine after the underlying litigation had been settled and the 
documents had been returned to the party resisting disclosure. We 
stated: 
We . . . hold that, absent allegations of fraud or 
other extraordinary circumstances, trial exhibits that 
were restored to their owner after a case has been 
completely terminated and which were properly subject 
to destruction by the clerk of court are no longer 
judicial records within the "supervisory power" of the 
district court. 
 
Id. at 683.  Under Littlejohn, even where there is no dispute 
that documents were at one time judicial records, once such 
documents are no longer part of the court file they lose their 
status as judicial records.0  Thus, in Littlejohn, as in 
                                                           
0But see Littlejohn, 851 F.2d at 688 (Scirica, J., dissenting).  
In his dissent, Judge Scirica stated: 
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Enprotech, we focused on the technical question of whether a 
document is physically on file with the court.  If it is not, it 
is not a "judicial record."  We pointed out in Leucadia that 
"[n]umerous other courts have also recognized the principle that 
the filing of a document gives rise to a presumptive right of 
public access."  998 F.2d at 161-62 (emphasis added).  See also 
Rittenhouse, 800 F.2d at 345 ("Once a settlement is filed in the 
district court, it becomes a judicial record, and subject to the 
access accorded such records." (emphasis added)).  In the matter 
presently before the court, the parties agree that the Settlement 
Agreement has never been filed with the court.   
 The Newspapers nevertheless argue that since the 
district court has entered an Order of Confidentiality over the 
Settlement Agreement, this in effect has converted the unfiled 
Settlement Agreement into a judicial record.  This argument 
fails.  Simply because a court has entered a confidentiality 
order over documents does not automatically convert those 
documents into "judicial records" accessible under the right of 
access doctrine.  For example, when a court enters an order of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Any member of the public, whether a student of the law, 
an interested observer, or a historian, will be 
required to assert his rights within two months or lose 
them forever. . . .  I do not view a local rule 
permitting return or destruction of exhibits as 
controlling the determination of right of access. 
Rather, the district judge should be permitted to 
inquire whether the contested items are still available 
from any source.  If the items exist, their character 
as judicial records renders them presumptively open to 
public examination, absent "improper purposes." 
 
Id. (citation omitted). 
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protection over documents exchanged during discovery, and these 
documents have not been filed with the court, such documents are 
not, by reason of the protective order alone, deemed judicial 
records to which the right of access attaches.  See Seattle Times 
Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 30-37, 104 S. Ct. 2199, 2206-10 
(1984); Leucadia, 998 F.2d at 163 & n.9; Cipollone v. Liggett 
Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1119-20 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 
484 U.S. 976, 108 S. Ct. 487 (1987). 
 The district court in this case stated that "it is 
further ordered that the terms of the settlement are confidential 
and the parties hereby are ordered and directed to abide by the 
order of confidentiality."  App. at 54-55.  Therefore, the 
district court granted an order of confidentiality over the terms 
of the Settlement Agreement.  It did not order the terms of the 
Settlement Agreement to be abided by the parties--nor could it, 
since the Settlement Agreement itself was never filed with the 
court. 
 The Order of Confidentiality is independent of any of 
the terms included within the Settlement Agreement, just as 
protective orders over discovery materials are independent of the 
items actually exchanged subject to such protective orders. 
Indeed, we have no way of knowing whether the Settlement 
Agreement itself includes a provision for confidentiality because 
the Settlement Agreement was never filed with the court and is 
not a part of the court record.  It is therefore not possible for 
us to find, as Enprotech requires in order to deem a settlement 
agreement a judicial record, that the district court ordered the 
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parties to comply with the terms of the Settlement Agreement. 983 
F.2d at 21 ("[T]he [Settlement] Agreement will not become a part 
of the public record unless and until the district court may 
order the parties to comply with its terms."). 
 The Newspapers further argue that the Settlement 
Agreement is a judicial record because the district court 
actually reviewed the Settlement Agreement before granting the 
Order of Confidentiality.  In its June 5, 1992 order, the 
district court stated: "[T]he parties having informed the Court 
that the . . . matter is settled and the Court having reviewed 
the terms of settlement, this action is hereby discontinued . . . 
."  App. at 54 (emphasis added).  By virtue of the fact that the 
district court reviewed the Settlement Agreement before granting 
its order, the Newspapers argue this converts the Settlement 
Agreement into a judicial record.  In support of this position, 
the Newspapers cite the decision by the Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit in FTC v. Standard Fin. Management Corp., 830 F.2d 
404 (1st Cir. 1987). 
 In Standard Financial, the court held that "relevant 
documents which are submitted to, and accepted by, a court of 
competent jurisdiction in the course of adjudicatory proceedings, 
become documents to which the presumption of public access 
applies."  Id. at 409.  Even though the disputed documents were 
not part of the court file, id. at 405-407, 413, the Standard 
Financial court held that they were nevertheless accessible under 
the right of access doctrine because "[t]hey were duly submitted 
to the court", id. at 410, and "were relevant and material to the 
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matters sub judice", id.  The Newspapers argue that since the 
Settlement Agreement was duly submitted to the district court, 
and the district court based its June 5, 1992 Order partly in 
reliance on this submission, Standard Financial controls and the 
Settlement Agreement is accessible under the right of access 
doctrine. 
 The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Standard 
Financial has articulated a persuasive and perhaps desirable 
rule.  Moreover, it may well be that during the life of a case, 
the issue of whether a document is a judicial record should turn 
on the use the court has made of it rather than on whether it has 
found its way into the clerk's file.  However, when the "judicial 
record" issue arose in this case, final judgment had been entered 
and no possibility of an appeal remained.  As a result, we find 
this case to be indistinguishable from Littlejohn and we are 
bound by the Internal Operating Procedures of this court to 
follow that decision.  Internal Operating Procedures of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 9.1 (July 
1990).  In Littlejohn, this court held that exhibits that have 
been admitted into evidence and relied upon by the court do not 
remain judicial records after the case is closed and they are 
returned to the parties.  851 F.2d at 683.  We are therefore 
clearly not at liberty here to bestow judicial record status on 
the Settlement Agreement, which the court briefly perused and 
returned to the parties in a now closed case.  But see 
Littlejohn, 851 F.2d at 688 (Scirica, J., dissenting) (A 
"district judge should be permitted to inquire whether the 
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contested items are still available from any source.").  The 
Settlement Agreement is not a "judicial record," and the district 
court correctly concluded that the Newspapers cannot obtain 
access to that document under the right of access doctrine.0 
4. Challenging the Order of Confidentiality 
 The Newspapers also made a motion in the district court 
to reconsider, vacate or modify the Confidentiality Order, as a 
matter independent of the right of access doctrine.  The district 
court denied the Newspapers' motion.  We review the grant or 
modification of a confidentiality order for abuse of discretion. 
See Republic of Philippines v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 949 F.2d 
653, 664 (3d Cir. 1991); Smith v. Bic Corp., 869 F.2d 194, 199 
(3d Cir. 1989).  However, we exercise plenary review over the 
district court's interpretation and application of the legal 
standard for granting or modifying a confidentiality order.  Cf. 
Savarese v. Agriss, 883 F.2d 1194 (3d Cir. 1989). 
                                                           
0The Newspapers make a technical argument as to why the 
Settlement Agreement is a judicial record accessible under the 
right of access doctrine.  Citing Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust and 
Savings Ass'n v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assocs., 800 F.2d 339, 344 (3d 
Cir. 1986), the Newspapers argue that since in settling the case 
the appellees did not meet the specific requirements of Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 41(a), governing voluntary dismissal, the Settlement 
Agreement must be considered a judicial record.  Although in 
Rittenhouse we did state in dicta that documents relating to a 
voluntary stipulation of dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1) 
would likely not be accessible under the right of access 
doctrine, 800 F.2d at 344, we did not at all suggest that any 
documents not relating to a Rule 41(a)(1) dismissal would 
automatically be accessible under the right of access doctrine. 
The Newspapers' argument overlooks the fact that the settlement 
agreement in Rittenhouse, unlike the one in the case presently 
before the court, was filed with the court.  800 F.2d at 344-45. 
As the above discussion indicates, whether the relevant document 
is in the court file is the critical inquiry. 
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 Even if the Settlement Agreement is not a judicial 
record, the Newspapers seek to modify or vacate the Order of 
Confidentiality controlling the Settlement Agreement.  Their 
reason for doing so is that if the Newspapers are successful in 
vacating the Order of Confidentiality, they will then be able to 
seek access to the Settlement Agreement under the Pennsylvania 
Right to Know Act, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 65, §§ 66.1-.4. (1959 & 
Supp. 1993), without interference by the federal court Order of 
Confidentiality. 
 It is important to note the practical difference 
between the Newspapers' failed attempt to obtain the Settlement 
Agreement under the right of access doctrine on the one hand, and 
on the other hand the Newspapers' attempt only to modify or 
vacate the Order of Confidentiality.  If the Newspapers had been 
successful in demonstrating that the Settlement Agreement was a 
judicial record for purposes of the right of access doctrine, the 
Settlement Agreement would have been made available by the 
district court itself, as a judicial record.  In contrast, if the 
Newspapers are successful in vacating the Order of 
Confidentiality, as a matter independent of the right of access 
doctrine, the district court will not then automatically grant 
access to the Settlement Agreement.  Rather, the Order of 
Confidentiality would merely be vacated, and the Newspapers would 
then be free to seek access to the Settlement Agreement through 
other legal channels, without interference by the Order of 
Confidentiality.  In fact, the Newspapers have already commenced 
a suit in Pennsylvania state court, seeking the Settlement 
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Agreement as a "public record" under the Pennsylvania Right to 
Know Act.  The state court stayed that action pending the outcome 
of this federal action. 
 If the Order of Confidentiality is vacated, then it 
appears that the Settlement Agreement will be made available by 
order of the state court pursuant to the Pennsylvania Right to 
Know Act.0  If the Order of Confidentiality is not vacated, then 
the state court would be unable to order the document accessible. 
This is because even though the Settlement Agreement would likely 
be available under the Pennsylvania Right to Know Act, the state 
court would be obligated to respect the already-existing federal 
court Order of Confidentiality.0  From these observations, it is 
                                                           
0In Morning Call, Inc. v. Lower Saucon Township, 627 A.2d 297 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993), the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania 
held that a settlement agreement entered into between a township 
and a private party was a "public record" subject to disclosure 
under the Pennsylvania Right to Know Act.  Id. at 299-301.  The 
court so held even though the parties to the settlement agreement 
had included a non-disclosure clause within the settlement 
agreement.  Id. at 298. 
0The Pennsylvania Right to Know Act provides that information 
restricted by order of a court is not a "public record" for the 
purposes of the Act.  Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 65, § 66.1(2) (Supp. 
1993). 
     Although neither the Full Faith and Credit Statute, 28 
U.S.C. § 1738, nor the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United 
States Constitution, U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1, mentions what 
obligations exist for state courts confronting federal court 
judgments, it is well recognized that state courts must give full 
faith and credit to federal court judgments.  E.g., Stoll v. 
Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 170-71, 59 S. Ct. 134, 136-37 (1938); 
Crescent City Live-Stock Landing & Slaughter-House Co. v. 
Butchers' Union Slaughter-House & Live-Stock Landing Co., 120 
U.S. 141, 146-47, 156-59, 7 S. Ct. 472, 474-75, 480-81 (1887). 
The state court's obligation to respect a prior federal court 
order which conflicts with state law also follows from the 
principle that states cannot curtail the jurisdiction of the 
federal courts.  Janice Toran, Secrecy Orders and Government 
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clear that the Newspapers have an interest in vacating the Order 
of Confidentiality even though we have rejected their attempt to 
obtain the Settlement Agreement under the right of access 
doctrine. 
 It is well-established that a district court retains 
the power to modify or lift confidentiality orders that it has 
entered.  See, e.g., United Nuclear Corp. v. Cranford Ins. Co., 
905 F.2d 1424, 1427 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 
1073, 111 S. Ct. 799 (1991); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. 
Litig., 821 F.2d 139, 145 (2d Cir.), cert. denied , 484 U.S. 953, 
108 S. Ct. 344 (1987); Palmieri v. New York, 779 F.2d 861, 864-65 
(2d Cir. 1985); In re Franklin Nat'l Bank Sec. Litig., 92 F.R.D. 
468, 471 (E.D.N.Y 1981), aff'd sub nom. FDIC, 677 F.2d 230 (2d 
Cir. 1982).  The issue of whether an order of confidentiality 
should be modified is separable from the question concerning 
whether a settlement agreement subject to that order is a 
judicial record for purposes of the right of access doctrine. 
Cf., e.g., Beckman Indus., Inc. v. International Ins. Co., 966 
F.2d 470, 471-76 (9th Cir. 1992); City of Hartford v. Chase, 942 
F.2d 130, 134-37 (2d Cir. 1991) (allowing intervening third 
parties to challenge confidentiality order over documents not 
part of court file); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 
1108, 1110-23 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 976, 108 S. 
Ct. 487 (1987).  Therefore, although we have already determined 
that the Settlement Agreement is not available under the right of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Litigants: "A Northwest Passage Around the Freedom of Information 
Act"?, 27 Ga. L. Rev. 121, 170-71 (1992). 
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access doctrine, we will consider whether the district court 
should have nevertheless modified or vacated the Order the 
Confidentiality which it ordered over the Settlement Agreement.  
 In favor of its position that the Order of 
Confidentiality should be vacated, the Newspapers argue that the 
district court lacked the power to enter an order of 
confidentiality over a document which is not in the court file 
nor incorporated into an order of the court.  We reject this 
argument.  Courts have inherent power to grant orders of 
confidentiality over materials not in the court file.  In Seattle 
Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 104 S. Ct. 2199 (1984), the 
Supreme Court confirmed that courts have the power to grant 
confidentiality orders over material not on file with the court, 
id. at 33 n.19, 104 S. Ct. at 2207 n.19, holding that "we have no 
question as to the court's jurisdiction to [enter protective 
orders] under the inherent 'equitable powers of courts of law 
over their own process, to prevent abuses, oppression, and 
injustices,'"  id. at 35, 104 S. Ct. at 2209 (quoting 
International Prods. Corp. v. Koons, 325 F.2d 403, 407-08 (2d 
Cir. 1963)).  See also, e.g., FDIC, 677 F.2d at 232 ("It is 
beyond question that a court may issue orders prohibiting 
disclosure of documents or information."). 
 The Newspapers also challenge the validity of the Order 
of Confidentiality because the Order was not entered pursuant to 
a rule of civil procedure or any other court rule.  The Order was 
entered over the Settlement Agreement, while the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure only address protective orders over materials 
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exchanged during discovery, Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c).  However, in 
Seattle Times, the Supreme Court made clear that courts have 
inherent equitable power to grant confidentiality orders, whether 
or not such orders are specifically authorized by procedural 
rules.  467 U.S. at 35, 104 S. Ct. at 2209. 
 Nevertheless, simply because courts have the power to 
grant orders of confidentiality does not mean that such orders 
may be granted arbitrarily.  Disturbingly, some courts routinely 
sign orders which contain confidentiality clauses without 
considering the propriety of such orders, or the countervailing 
public interests which are sacrificed by the orders.0  Because 
                                                           
0In City of Hartford v. Chase, 942 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1991), Judge 
Pratt, in a concurring opinion, made the following insightful 
observations: 
 
A . . . troubling tendency accompanies the increasing 
frequency and scope of confidentiality agreements that 
are ordered by the court.  These agreements are reached 
by private parties and often involve materials and 
information that is never even presented to the court. 
With the signature of a federal judge, however, they 
are converted into a powerful means of maintaining and 
enforcing secrecy.  Once signed, a confidentiality 
order, which has converted a private agreement into an 
order of the court, requires the court to use its 
contempt power to enforce the private agreement. . . . 
[B]ecause they often involve information not in the 
control of the court, and may . . . implicate public 
concerns, confidentiality orders, when not subject to 
proper supervision, have a great potential for abuse. 
For this reason, judges should review such agreements 
carefully and skeptically before signing them. 
 
Id. at 137-38 (Pratt, J., concurring).  See also Toran, supra 
note 13, at 124-26; Brian T. FitzGerald, Note, Sealed v. Sealed: 
A Public Court System Going Secretly Private, 6 J.L. & Pol. 381, 
382 (1990) ("Unfortunately, the incidence of secrecy in the 
judicial process appears to be on the rise, particularly in the 
complex litigation area.  Equally disturbing is the trend for 
30 
defendants request orders of confidentiality as a condition of 
settlement, courts are willing to grant these requests in an 
effort to facilitate settlement without sufficiently inquiring 
into the potential public interest in obtaining information 
concerning the settlement agreement.  The public's interest is 
particularly legitimate and important where, as in this case, at 
least one of the parties to the action is a public entity or 
official. 
 In this case, the district court made no findings for 
the record when it initially granted the Order of 
Confidentiality, and apparently did not balance the competing 
public and privacy interests before entering the Order.  In 
denying the Newspapers' Motion to Reconsider, Vacate or Modify 
the Order, the district court did not explain why the need for 
confidentiality outweighed the Newspapers' interest in obtaining 
access to the Settlement Agreement pursuant to the Pennsylvania 
Right to Know Act.0  We must determine whether the district court 
appropriately exercised its discretion in granting and 
maintaining the Order of Confidentiality. 
 In the context of discovery, it is well-established 
that a party wishing to obtain an order of protection over 
discovery material must demonstrate that "good cause" exists for 
the order of protection.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c); Smith v. Bic 
Corp., 869 F.2d 194, 199 (3d Cir. 1989).  In this case, the Order 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
parties to condition any pre-trial settlement on the court's 
granting a total sealing order covering all materials in the 
court's possession." (footnotes omitted)). 
0See supra note 12. 
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of Confidentiality was not entered over discovery materials, but 
rather over a settlement agreement.  Protective orders over 
discovery materials and orders of confidentiality over matters 
relating to other stages of litigation have comparable features 
and raise similar public policy concerns.  All such orders are 
intended to offer litigants a measure of privacy, while balancing 
against this privacy interest the public's right to obtain 
information concerning judicial proceedings.  Also, protective 
orders over discovery and confidentiality orders over matters 
concerning other stages of litigation are often used by courts as 
a means to aid the progression of litigation and facilitate 
settlements.  Protective orders and orders of confidentiality are 
functionally similar, and require similar balancing between 
public and private concerns.  We therefore exercise our inherent 
supervisory power0 to conclude that whether an order of 
confidentiality is granted at the discovery stage or any other 
                                                           
0
"While we adhere firmly to the view that our supervisory power 
should not be invoked lightly, we believe that circumstances 
warrant its application here."  Sowell v. Butcher & Singer, Inc., 
926 F.2d 289, 295 (3d Cir. 1991) (requiring district courts 
entering a directed verdict to set forth an explanation for the 
court's order).  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not 
discuss confidentiality orders outside the context of discovery.  
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) (protective orders).  "In the absence 
of procedural rules specifically covering a situation, the court 
may, pursuant to its inherent power . . . fashion a rule not 
inconsistent with the Federal Rules."  Franquez v. United States, 
604 F.2d 1239, 1244-45 (9th Cir. 1979) (footnote omitted).  If, 
as we have recognized above, a district court has inherent power 
to enter orders of confidentiality outside the context of 
discovery despite the fact that such orders are not made pursuant 
to any federal rule, it is appropriate for an appellate court to 
exercise its supervisory power to ensure that such orders are not 
granted arbitrarily. 
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stage of litigation, including settlement, good cause must be 
demonstrated to justify such orders.  Cf. City of Hartford v. 
Chase, 942 F.2d 130, 136 (2d Cir. 1991) ("We do not . . . give 
parties carte blanche either to seal documents related to a 
settlement agreement or to withhold documents they deem so 
'related.'  Rather, the trial court--not the parties themselves--
should scrutinize every such agreement involving the sealing of 
court papers and [determine] what, if any, of them are to be 
sealed, and it is only after very careful, particularized review 
by the court that a Confidentiality Order may be executed."). 
 "Good cause is established on a showing that disclosure 
will work a clearly defined and serious injury to the party 
seeking closure.  The injury must be shown with specificity." 
Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1071 (3d Cir. 
1984).  "Broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific 
examples or articulated reasoning," do not support a good cause 
showing.  Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1121 
(3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 976, 108 S. Ct. 487 
(1987).  The burden of justifying the confidentiality of each and 
every document sought to be covered by a protective order remains 
on the party seeking the order.  Id. at 1122.0 
                                                           
0However, because of the benefits of umbrella protective orders 
in cases involving large-scale discovery, the court may construct 
a broad umbrella protective order upon a threshold showing by the 
movant of good cause.  Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 
1108, 1122 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 976, 108 S. Ct. 
487 (1987).  After delivery of the documents, the opposing party 
would have the opportunity to indicate precisely which documents 
it believed not to be confidential, and the party seeking to 
maintain the seal would have the burden of proof with respect to 
those documents.  Id. 
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   In considering whether good cause exists for a 
protective order, the federal courts have generally adopted a 
balancing process.  Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective 
Orders, and Public Access to the Courts, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 427, 
432-33 (1991).  The balancing conducted in the discovery context 
should be applied by courts when considering whether to grant 
confidentiality orders at any stage of litigation, including 
settlement: 
[T]he court . . . must balance the requesting party's 
need for information against the injury that might 
result if uncontrolled disclosure is compelled.  When 
the risk of harm to the owner of [a] trade secret or 
confidential information outweighs the need for 
discovery, disclosure [through discovery] cannot be 
compelled, but this is an infrequent result. 
 Once the court determines that the discovery 
policies require that the materials be disclosed, the 
issue becomes whether they should "be disclosed only in 
a designated way," as authorized by the last clause of 
Rule 26(c)(7) . . . .  Whether this disclosure will be 
limited depends on a judicial balancing of the harm to 
the party seeking protection (or third persons) and the 
importance of disclosure to the public.  Courts also 
have a great deal of flexibility in crafting the 
contents of protective orders to minimize the negative 
consequences of disclosure and serve the public 
interest simultaneously. 
 
Id. at 433-35 (footnotes omitted).  "The most common kind of 
order allowing discovery on conditions is an order limiting the 
persons who are to have access to the information disclosed and 
the use to which these persons may put the information."  8 
Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 2043, at 305 (1970). 
 One interest which should be recognized in the 
balancing process is an interest in privacy.  See Seattle Times 
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Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 34-36, 104 S. Ct. 2199, 2208-09 
(1984).  It is appropriate for courts to order confidentiality to 
prevent the infliction of unnecessary or serious pain on parties 
who the court reasonably finds are entitled to such protection. 
In this vein, a factor to consider is whether the information is 
being sought for a legitimate purpose or for an improper purpose. 
However, privacy interests are diminished when the party seeking 
protection is a public person subject to legitimate public 
scrutiny.  Cf. United States v. Smith, 776 F.2d 1104, 1114 (3d 
Cir. 1985) ("[T]he public has a substantial interest in the 
integrity or lack of integrity of those who serve them in public 
office.").0 
 While preventing embarrassment may be a factor 
satisfying the "good cause" standard, 
an applicant for a protective order whose chief concern 
is embarrassment must demonstrate that the 
embarrassment will be particularly serious.  As 
embarrassment is usually thought of as a nonmonetizable 
harm to individuals, it may be especially difficult for 
a business enterprise, whose primary measure of well-
being is presumably monetizable, to argue for a 
protective order on this ground. 
 
Cipollone, 785 F.2d at 1121.  Circumstances weighing against 
confidentiality exist when confidentiality is being sought over 
information important to public health and safety, e.g., Miller, 
105 Harv. L. Rev. at 478, and when the sharing of information 
                                                           
0See also Vassiliades v. Israely, 714 F. Supp. 604, 606 (D. Conn. 
1989) ("Every lawsuit has the potential for creating some adverse 
or otherwise unwanted publicity for the parties involved. It is 
simply one of the costs attendant to the filing of an action."). 
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among litigants would promote fairness and efficiency, e.g., id. 
at 490. 
 A factor which a court should consider in conducting 
the good cause balancing test is whether a party benefitting from 
the order of confidentiality is a public entity or official. 
Similarly, the district court should consider whether the case 
involves issues important to the public.  If a settlement 
agreement involves issues or parties of a public nature, and 
involves matters of legitimate public concern, that should be a 
factor weighing against entering or maintaining an order of 
confidentiality.  See, e.g., FTC. v. Standard Fin. Management 
Corp., 830 F.2d 404, 412 (1st Cir. 1987) (threshold for sealing 
is elevated because the case involves a government agency and 
matters of public concern).0   On the other hand, if a case 
                                                           
0See also Johnson v. Greater Southeast Community Hosp. Corp., 951 
F.2d 1268, 1277-78 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Arkwright Mutual Ins. Co. v. 
Garrett & West, Inc., 782 F. Supp. 376, 381 (N.D. Ill. 1991) 
("The courts are public institutions and their proceedings should 
be public unless a compelling argument for secrecy can be made.  
The matters with which this case is concerned are of significant 
and legitimate public concern. . . . The public has a right to 
know of this resolution.");  City of Hartford v. Chase, 733 F. 
Supp. 533, 536 n.5 (D. Conn. 1990) ("Where the parties are 
private, the right to rely on confidentiality in their dealings 
is more compelling than where a government agency is involved, as 
the public has a countering interest in, and thus the claim of 
access to the conduct of public business by a governmental 
agency."), rev'd, 942 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. 
Kentucky Utils. Co., 124 F.R.D. 146, 150 (E.D. Ky. 1989) ("[The 
parties] attempt to assume the posture of private parties who 
have settled a case and have a right of privacy in documents 
maintained outside the court record. . . . Here, however, the 
parties are not private parties.  One of the parties is the 
federal government."), rev'd, 927 F.2d 252 (6th Cir. 1991); In re 
"Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 99 F.R.D. 645, 648-50 
(E.D.N.Y. 1983). 
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involves private litigants, and concerns matters of little 
legitimate public interest, that should be a factor weighing in 
favor of granting or maintaining an order of confidentiality. 
 In this balancing process, the issue arises of how much 
weight should be assigned the interest in encouraging 
settlements.  District courts should not rely on the general 
interest in encouraging settlement, and should require a 
particularized showing of the need for confidentiality in 
reaching a settlement.  Cf. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust and Sav. 
Ass'n v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assocs., 800 F.2d 339, 346 (3d Cir. 
1986) (requiring particularized showing of need for secrecy to 
further settlement in a right of access doctrine case).  Even 
when a particularized need for confidentiality is put forth by 
the parties, the interest in furthering settlement should only be 
one factor in the district court's determination.  This is 
because, as one court put it, 
settlements will be entered into in most cases whether 
or not confidentiality can be maintained.  The parties 
might prefer to have confidentiality, but this does not 
mean that they would not settle otherwise.  For one 
thing, if the case goes to trial, even more is likely 
to be disclosed than if the public has access to 
pretrial matters. 
 
United States v. Kentucky Utils. Co., 124 F.R.D. 146, 153 (E.D. 
Ky. 1989), rev'd, 927 F.2d 252 (6th Cir. 1991).0   
                                                           
0Accord Anne-Therese Bechamps, Note, Sealed Out-of-Court 
Settlements: When Does the Public Have a Right to Know?, 66 Notre 
Dame L. Rev. 117, 130 (1990) ("The incentives for settling, such 
as saving time and expense and avoiding the publicity of a trial, 
are still valid whether or not the parties are allowed to seal 
the case files.").  Cf. Wilson v. American Motors Corp., 759 F.2d 
1568 (11th Cir. 1985).  In Wilson, the court acknowledged that 
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 Moreover, if parties cannot demonstrate good cause for 
a court order of confidentiality over the terms of settlement, 
they have the option of agreeing privately to keep information 
concerning settlement confidential, and may enforce such an 
agreement in a separate contract action.0  See, e.g., Marine 
Midland Realty Credit Corp. v. LLMD of Michigan, Inc., 821 F. 
Supp. 370, 371-74 (E.D. Pa. 1993).  Although it is more arduous 
to commence a new action to enforce a settlement agreement than 
to rely on the court's contempt power to enforce a court order of 
confidentiality, it must be remembered that balanced against the 
interest of settlement is the interest of the public to have 
access to information concerning judicial proceedings.  Thus, to 
the extent that fewer orders of confidentiality are granted, and 
to the extent that parties may have to more often enforce orders 
of confidentiality in private contract suits, we believe that 
this may in fact be preferable to the current trend of increasing 
judicial secrecy.   
 The factors discussed above are unavoidably vague and 
are of course not exhaustive.  Although the balancing test 
discussed above may be criticized as being ambiguous and likely 
to lead to unpredictable results, we believe that such a 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
courts should encourage settlements.  Id. at 1571 n.4. 
Nevertheless, the court said that encouraging monetary settlement 
between the parties was not even entitled to consideration in 
deciding whether to seal the record.  Id. 
0In some circumstances, a private agreement to keep terms of a 
settlement confidential may be unenforceable because it violates 
public policy.  E.g., Anchorage Sch. Dist. v. Anchorage Daily 
News, 779 P.2d 1191, 1193 (Alaska 1989) (confidentiality 
provision unenforceable because it violated public records 
disclosure statutes). 
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balancing test is necessary to provide the district courts the 
flexibility needed to justly and properly consider the factors of 
each case. 
 Discretion should be left with the court to 
evaluate the competing considerations in light of the 
facts of individual cases.  By focusing on the 
particular circumstances in the cases before them, 
courts are in the best position to prevent both the 
overly broad use of [confidentiality] orders and the 
unnecessary denial of confidentiality for information 
that deserves it . . . . 
 
Miller, 105 Harv. L. Rev. at 492. 
 To facilitate effective appellate review of a district 
court decision of whether to grant or modify an order of 
protection or confidentiality, a district court should articulate 
on the record findings supporting its judgment.0  In appropriate 
cases, the district court may seal that portion of the record 
which contains its findings, for in some circumstances the 
court's articulation of its findings might destroy the very 
confidentiality being sought. 
 In determining whether to modify an already-existing 
confidentiality order, the parties' reliance on the order is a 
relevant factor.  E.g., Anne-Therese Bechamps, Note, Sealed Out 
of Court Settlements: When Does the Public Have a Right to Know?, 
66 Notre Dame L. Rev. 117, 130 (1990); see also, e.g., City of 
                                                           
0We have, when appropriate, exercised our inherent supervisory 
power to require the district courts to provide an explanation 
for certain types of orders to assist our statutory function of 
appellate review.  E.g., Sowell v. Butcher & Singer, Inc., 926 
F.2d 289, 295 (3d Cir. 1991) (orders granting directed verdicts); 
Vadino v. A. Valey Eng'rs, 903 F.2d 253, 258-59 (3d Cir. 1990) 
(orders granting summary judgment). 
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Hartford v. Chase, 942 F.2d 130, 136 (2d Cir. 1991).0  However, 
there is a split in authority on the weight to be accorded the 
reliance interest. 
 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has 
announced a stringent standard for modification, holding that a 
confidentiality order can only be modified if an extraordinary 
circumstance or compelling need warrants the requested 
modification.  City of Hartford, 942 F.2d at 135-36; Palmieri v. 
New York, 779 F.2d 861, 864-66 (2d Cir. 1985); Federal Deposit 
Ins. Corp. v. Ernst & Ernst, 677 F.2d 230, 232 (2d Cir. 1982).0 
 Other courts of appeals have rejected this stringent 
standard, have held that a more lenient test for modification 
applies, but have failed to articulate precisely what that 
standard is.  E.g., Beckman Indus., Inc. v. International Ins. 
Co., 966 F.2d 470, 475-76 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,  ___ U.S. 
___, 113 S. Ct 197 (1992); United Nuclear Corp. v. Cranford Ins. 
Co., 905 F.2d 1424, 1428 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 
1073, 111 S. Ct. 799 (1991); Public Citizen v. Liggett Group, 
Inc., 858 F.2d 775, 791 (1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 
1030, 109 S. Ct. 838 (1989); see Meyer Goldberg, Inc. of Lorain 
v. Fisher Foods, Inc., 823 F.2d 159, 163-64 (6th Cir. 1987). 
                                                           
0The fact that the parties' reliance becomes relevant later on 
illustrates how important it is for courts to initially conduct a 
proper balancing analysis to determine whether a confidentiality 
order should be granted. 
0The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has apparently 
adopted the Second Circuit's standard.  See United States v. 
Kentucky Utils. Co., 927 F.2d 252, 255 (6th Cir. 1991).  But see 
Meyer Goldberg, Inc. of Lorain v. Fisher Foods, Inc., 823 F.2d 
159, 163-64 (6th Cir. 1987). 
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 We agree with these courts that the standard of the 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for modification is too 
stringent.  The appropriate approach in considering motions to 
modify confidentiality orders is to use the same balancing test 
that is used in determining whether to grant such orders in the 
first instance,0 with one difference: one of the factors the 
court should consider in determining whether to modify the order 
is the reliance by the original parties on the confidentiality 
order.  The parties' reliance on an order, however, should not be 
outcome determinative, and should only be one factor that a court 
considers when determining whether to modify an order of 
confidentiality. "[E]ven though the parties to [a] settlement 
agreement have acted in reliance upon that order, they [do] so 
with knowledge that under some circumstances such orders may be 
modified by the court."  City of Hartford, 942 F.2d at 138 
(Pratt, J., concurring). 
The extent to which a party can rely on a protective 
order should depend on the extent to which the order 
induced the party to allow discovery or to settle the 
case.  For instance, reliance would be greater where a 
trade secret was involved, or where witnesses had 
testified pursuant to a protective order without 
invoking their Fifth Amendment privilege. . . . 
 . . . Reliance will be less with a blanket order, 
because it is by nature overinclusive. 
 
                                                           
0Cf. Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied Extrusion Technologies, Inc., 998 
F.2d 157, 166 (3d Cir. 1993) ("Although our decision [in a 
previous case] concerned the challenge by a party to the 
confidentiality designation made by its opponent, our reasoning 
applies with equal force when a non-party moves to intervene in a 
pending or settled lawsuit for the limited purpose of modifying a 
protective order and inspecting documents filed under seal."). 
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Beckman, 966 F.2d at 475-76 (citation omitted).0 
 "[R]eliance on [confidentiality] orders [will] not 
insulate those orders from subsequent modification or vacating if 
the orders were improvidently granted ab initio. . . . [N]o 
amount of official encouragement and reliance thereon could 
substantiate an unquestioning adherence to an order improvidently 
granted."  Palmieri, 779 F.2d at 865.  "Improvidence in the 
granting of a protective order is [a] justification for lifting 
or modifying the order."  In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. 
Litig., 821 F.2d 139, 148 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 953, 
108 S. Ct. 344 (1987).  It would be improper and unfair to afford 
an order presumptive correctness if it is apparent that the court 
did not engage in the proper balancing to initially determine 
whether the order should have been granted.0 
 The party seeking to modify the order of 
confidentiality must come forward with a reason to modify the 
order.  Once that is done, the court should then balance the 
interests, including the reliance by the original parties to the 
order, to determine whether good cause still exists for the 
order. 
If access to protected [material] can be granted 
without harm to legitimate secrecy interests, or if no 
such interests exist, continued judicial protection 
                                                           
0Accord Public Citizen, 858 F.2d at 790 ("Although . . . blanket 
protective orders may be useful in expediting the flow of 
pretrial discovery materials, they are by nature overinclusive 
and are, therefore, peculiarly subject to later modification."). 
0But see Mokhiber v. Davis, 537 A.2d 1100, 1116 n.15 (D.C. 1988) 
("[I]t is quite proper for the trial court to place upon the 
attacking party the burden of showing that no such 'good cause' 
in fact existed; that is, the presumption in favor of the 
correctness of trial court actions is operative."). 
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cannot be justified.  In that case, access should be 
granted even if the need for the protected materials is 
minimal.  When that is not the case, the court should 
require the party seeking modification to show why the 
secrecy interests deserve less protection than they did 
when the order was granted.  Even then, however, the 
movant should not be saddled with a burden more onerous 
than explaining why his need for the materials 
outweighs existing privacy concerns. 
 
Note, Nonparty Access to Discovery Materials in the Federal 
Courts, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1085, 1092 (1981), cited with approval 
in Meyer Goldberg, Inc. of Lorain v. Fisher Foods, Inc., 823 F.2d 
159, 163 (6th Cir. 1987).  
 This case presents another factor which must be 
considered in the good cause balancing test.  The Settlement 
Agreement to which the Newspapers are seeking access would, but 
for the Confidentiality Order, likely be accessible under the 
Pennsylvania Right to Know Act, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 65, §§ 66.1-
.4 (1959 & Supp. 1993).0  This case thus illustrates how 
confidentiality orders can frustrate, if not render useless, 
federal and state freedom of information laws.0  When a court 
orders confidentiality in a suit involving a governmental entity, 
                                                           
0See supra notes 12-13. 
0The federal Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") is codified at 5 
U.S.C. § 552.  All fifty states have some form of freedom of 
information legislation.  Toran, supra note 13, at 129 n.38 
(1992). 
     Federal courts are explicitly exempt from the Freedom of 
Information Act's coverage.  5 U.S.C. § 551(1)(B).  In GTE 
Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 445 
U.S. 375, 100 S. Ct. 1194 (1980), the Supreme Court held that a 
federal agency which had been previously ordered by a court not 
to disclose information was not required to release such 
information under the FOIA.  Id. at 386-87, 100 S. Ct. at 1201-
02.  It is precisely because courts have the power to trump 
freedom of information laws that they should exercise this power 
judiciously and sparingly. 
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as the district court in this case did, there arises a 
troublesome conflict between the governmental entity's interest 
as a litigant and its public disclosure obligations.  The 
difficult problems created by such a conflict have finally 
received scholarly attention.  See generally Janice Toran, 
Secrecy Orders and Government Litigants: "A Northwest Passage 
Around the Freedom of Information Act"?, 27 Ga. L. Rev. 121 
(1992).  In this case, the Newspapers have had to endure 
considerable time and expense to obtain access to information 
which, but for the Order of Confidentiality, is likely available 
under the applicable freedom of information law.0  Because the 
Newspapers have been forced to challenge the Order of 
Confidentiality, many months have passed since they made their 
initial request for the desired documents.  This case thus 
illustrates the need for increased judicial awareness of the 
public interest in access to information under relevant freedom 
of information laws.  Accordingly,  
where [a governmental entity] is a party to litigation, 
no protective, sealing or other confidentiality order 
shall be entered without consideration of its effect on 
disclosure of [government] records to the public under 
[state and federal freedom of information laws].  An 
order binding [governmental entities] shall be narrowly 
drawn to avoid interference with the rights of the 
public to obtain disclosure of [government] records and 
shall provide an explanation of the extent to which the 
order is intended to alter those rights. 
 
Id. at 182. 
 
 To provide some measure of uniformity and 
predictability of outcome in this important area, we hold that 
                                                           
0See supra note 12. 
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where it is likely that information is accessible under a 
relevant freedom of information law, a strong presumption exists 
against granting or maintaining an order of confidentiality whose 
scope would prevent disclosure of that information pursuant to 
the relevant freedom of information law.  In the good cause 
balancing test, this strong presumption tilts the scales heavily 
against entering or maintaining an order of confidentiality.  To 
avoid complicated inquiries as to whether certain information 
would in fact be available under a freedom of information law, 
courts may choose to grant conditional orders.  For example, a 
court could order that the order of confidentiality will become 
inoperative if the information it orders confidential is later 
determined to be available under a freedom of information law. Or 
a court could grant an order of confidentiality while specifying 
that the scope of the confidentiality order does not extend so as 
to prevent disclosure pursuant to any freedom of information law.  
Courts have discretion to fashion such orders according to the 
needs and circumstances of each case. 
 We acknowledge the important role that court-aided 
settlement plays in our overburdened court system, and we realize 
that a strong presumption against confidentiality orders when 
freedom of information laws are implicated may interfere with the 
ability of courts to successfully encourage the settlement of 
cases.  However, we believe that a strong presumption against 
entering or maintaining confidentiality orders strikes the 
appropriate balance by recognizing the enduring beliefs 
underlying freedom of information laws: that an informed public 
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is desirable, that access to information prevents governmental 
abuse and helps secure freedom, and that, ultimately, government 
must answer to its citizens.  Neither the interests of parties in 
settling cases, nor the interests of the federal courts in 
cleaning their dockets, can be said to outweigh the important 
values manifested by freedom of information laws. 
 In the case before us, the district court made no 
findings for the record supporting its initial grant of the Order 
of Confidentiality.  The district court apparently did not 
conduct any balancing test at all before signing the Order.  The 
Order of Confidentiality was thus improvidently granted, and the 
reliance interest of the parties in the confidentiality of the 
Settlement Agreement must be considered weak in this case. 
Moreover, in denying the Newspapers' Motion to Reconsider, Vacate 
or Modify the Order of Confidentiality, the district court again 
did not articulate any findings demonstrating good cause for the 
Order.  The district court noted in passing that some information 
concerning the cost of the settlement to the Borough has been 
made public.  But it never explained why the Newspapers' interest 
in obtaining access to the Settlement Agreement itself under the 
Pennsylvania Right to Know Act was outweighed by the need for 
confidentiality.  The entry of the Order of Confidentiality 
therefore did not reflect the proper exercise of discretion by 
the district court.0 
                                                           
0Because the Order of Confidentiality was ordered over a 
settlement agreement that was never filed with the court, and the 
order of confidentiality did not close a judicial proceeding to 
the public or seal judicial records, we do not apply the 
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 Because we have provided guidance in a previously 
unchartered area, we will remand the case to the district court 
and provide it an opportunity to determine whether there are 
circumstances justifying an order of confidentiality over the 
Settlement Agreement.  This case involves a governmental body, a 
public official, and a Settlement Agreement which is likely 
available under the Pennsylvania Right to Know Act.  Given these 
facts, it would be unusual if on remand the district court were 
to find that circumstances exist which justify the Order of 
Confidentiality being maintained over the Settlement Agreement, 
but we do not foreclose that determination.0 
 We will reverse the district court's order denying 
intervention, dated May 13, 1993.  We will remand the case to the 
district court with a direction that the Newspapers be permitted 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
standards we have articulated in our line of cases dealing with 
access to judicial proceedings and documents.  E.g., Miller v. 
Indiana Hosp., 16 F.3d 549, 551 (3d Cir. 1994); Publicker Indus., 
Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1071-75 (3d Cir. 1984); United 
States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 554-62 (3d Cir. 1982). 
     Also, the Newspapers have not challenged the Order of 
Confidentiality as a prior restraint or "gag order", and we 
therefore do not conduct any prior restraint analysis under the 
First Amendment.  We note that in this case, a prior restraint 
claim by the Newspapers would lack merit because none of the 
parties subject to the Order of Confidentiality has indicated 
that it would willingly provide the Settlement Agreement to the 
Newspapers if the Order of Confidentiality were vacated.  Cf. 
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer 
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756-57, 96 S. Ct. 1817, 1822-23 
(1976). 
0However, any interest in confidentiality either must arise under 
federal law or must be an interest which the Pennsylvania state 
courts would determine is sufficient to prevent disclosure under 
the Right to Know Act. 
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to intervene, and for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
